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The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment Prohibits the Execution of
Mentally Retarded Defendants: Atkins v. Virginia
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EIGHTH AMENDMENT - CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT - The Supreme Court of the United States
held that executing mentally retarded defendants violated the
cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 304 (2002)
On the night of August 16, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins, flanked
by William Jones, abducted Eric Nesbitt, setting into motion a
series of events that eventually led to the murder of Nesbitt.! At
around midnight on that fateful night, armed with a semiauto-
matic handgun, Atkins and Jones abducted Nesbitt and forced
him to turn over his money.2 They then drove Nesbitt to an auto-
mated teller machine and forced him to withdraw more money,
with Atkins and Jones being recorded by a security camera.3 Fi-
nally, Nesbitt was driven to an isolated location.4 It was at this
isolated location that he was shot eight times and killed.5
At the guilt phase of Atkins' trial, both he and Jones took the
stand and testified about the events of the evening in question.6
Their accounts of the abduction and murder were virtually identi-
cal, with one crucial difference: each testified that the other was
the one who actually pulled the trigger and killed Eric Nesbitt.7
After hearing both descriptions of the events leading to Nesbitt's
murder, the jury believed Jones' statements to be more coherent
and credible, and found Atkins guilty of capital murder.8
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002).




6. Id. Although Atkins and Jones were originally both indicted for capital murder,
Jones pled guilty to first-degree murder as part of a bargain for his testimony against At-
kins. This bargain ultimately rendered him ineligible for the death penalty. Id. at 307, n. 1.
7. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
8. Id. at 307.
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Another blow was dealt to Atkins during the penalty phase of
the trial.9 Based on the victim impact evidence, which indicated
two aggravating circumstances, the jury believed the death pen-
alty to be appropriate."° The aggravating circumstances estab-
lished by the State were future dangerousness and "vileness of the
offense".'1 Atkins' prior felony convictions for robbery and assault,
along with the testimony of victims of those previous acts, were
used to infer that Atkins would likely be dangerous in the future. 2
The autopsy report and pictures of the deceased body served as
the foundation for the finding of the second aggravating circum-
stance, "vileness of the offense".'3
At the penalty phase of the trial, a forensic psychologist testify-
ing for the defense, Dr. Evan Nelson, gave his expert opinion on
the mental capacity of Atkins.'4 Dr. Nelson's testimony revealed
that he had evaluated Atkins prior to the commencement of trial
and that Dr. Nelson determined that Atkins was "mildly mentally
retarded.""5 "Mild" mental retardation is described as a person
with an intelligence quotient of 50-55 to 70.16 Dr. Nelson made his
determination of Akins' level of retardation based on interviews
with those who knew him, school records, and by the administra-
9. Id. at 308.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id at 309. The definition of mental retardation used by the Court is that of the
American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) and the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation. AAMR's definition is as follows:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is
characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concur-
rently with related limitations in two or more or the following applicable adaptive
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-
direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retar-
dation manifests before age 18.
MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (Amer.
Ass'n of Mental Retardation, 9th ed. 1992).
Similarly, the American Psychiatric Association's definition is as follows:
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intel-
lectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in
adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-
care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-
direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety (Criterion B).
The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C).
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000). Id. at 309, n.3.
16. Id., See American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 42-43 (4th ed. 2000).
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tion of an intelligence test.17 The results of the intelligence test
demonstrated that Atkins had an IQ of 59.18 Dr. Nelson further
testified that less than one percentile of the general population
has an IQ level comparable to Atkins'.19
Disregarding Atkins' apparent mental retardation, the jury de-
termined that a punishment of death was appropriate." The case
meandered its way through the appeals process and landed itself
in front of the Virginia Supreme Court.2' The Virginia Supreme
court held that the trial court used a misleading verdict form and
remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.2 Dr. Nelson
again testified at the second sentencing hearing to the same find-
ings to which he previously testified.23 The State, in rebuttal to Dr.
Nelson's testimony, presented an expert witness, Dr. Stanton
Samenow, who testified that Atkins was of "average intelligence,
at least" and that no level of mental retardation was exhibited by
Atkins. 24  According to Dr. Samenow, Atkins did suffer from an
antisocial personality disorder.2' For the second time, the jury
sentenced Atkins to death.26
For the second time, the Virginia Supreme Court examined At-
kins' case, this time affirming the death sentence." Before the
Virginia Supreme Court, Atkins did not challenge his sentence on
the basis that the punishment was disproportional to the crime,
but rather that his mental retardation should preclude him from
17. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309.
18. Id. The intelligence test administered by Dr. Nelson is entitled the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scales test (WAIS-III). The WAIS-Ill is the standard test given in the United
States for determining the intellectual capacity of a person. A person's intellectual func-
tioning level is determined by totaling the points scored on certain subtests. This score is
then converted into a scaled score, by the use of a mathematical formula. The range of the
scaled score is from 45 to 155, with a score of 100 indicating a person of average intelli-
gence. A. KAUFMAN & LICHTENBERGER, ESSENTIALS OF WAISIII ASSESSMENT 60 (1999).
Id. at 309, n.5.
19. Id. at 309, n.5.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309. See. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445 (1999). The
Virginia Supreme Court found the verdict form to be misleading because it failed to give
the jury the option of imposing a life sentence if neither of the aggravating circumstances
were found beyond a reasonable doubt.
23. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309.
24. Id.
25. Id. Dr. Samenow conducted two interviews with Atkins, interviewed the correc-
tional staff, and reviewed Atkins' school records to formulate his diagnosis. An intelligence
test was not given, but Dr. Savenow did use questions from a version of the Wechsler Mem-
ory Scale in conducting his interview. Id. at 309, n. 6.
26. Id.
27. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 318 (2000).
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capital punishment." This argument was rejected by the Virginia
Supreme Court, which based its finding on the rationale in Penry
v. Lynaugh,29 where the United States Supreme Court held that
mental retardation does not lower a defendant's level of culpabil-
ity to a level that would preclude him from receiving the death
penalty. In the dissenting opinion, Justices Hassell and Koontz
felt that Atkins' mental state should preclude him from receiving
the death penalty and remarked that "the imposition of the sen-
tence of death upon a criminal defendant who has the mental age
of a child between the ages of 9 and 12 is excessive."" The dis-
senters continued:
It is indefensible to conclude that individuals who are men-
tally retarded are not to some degree less culpable for their
criminal acts. By definition, such individuals have substan-
tial limitations not shared by the general population. A moral
and civilized society diminishes itself if its system of justice
does not afford recognition and consideration of those limita-
tions in a meaningful way.3 2
The Supreme Court of the United States, in light of the issues
raised by the dissenting members of the Virginia Supreme Court
and the drastic changes in state legislation since Penry v. Lynaugh
was decided, granted certiorari to readdress the issue of whether
mentally retarded criminals meet the level of criminal culpability
necessary for the administration of the death penalty.33
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
hibits punishments that are excessive.34 Justice Stevens, in deliv-
ering the majority opinion, offered a brief history of how the Court
has interpreted the "cruel and unusual" clause of the Eighth
Amendment." He noted, for example, that the Court has held that
12 years in jail with hard labor for falsifying records was excessive
and unconstitutional, stating, "that it is a precept of justice that
punishment for a crime should be graduated and proportional to
28. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
29. Id. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
30. Id.
31. Id. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 324 (2000).
32. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 325 (2000).
33. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The language of the Amendment is as follows: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
35. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
814 Vol. 41
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the offense."36 Proportionality alone is not the only test used to
gauge the appropriateness of a punishment under the Eighth
Amendment: a punishment must also not be excessive."
Whether or not a punishment is excessive is not determined by
the standards of society when the Bill of Rights was constructed.38
Instead, excessiveness should be determined by the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety."39 In order to decide the proper method for determining the
"evolving standard of decency," Justice Stevens referred to the
Penry decision, where the Court stated that the clearest and most
objective determination of societal values could be made by exam-
ining state legislation. ° The Court has used this method of rely-
ing on state legislation, for example, to decide that a death sen-
tence is impermissible for rape or for a crime where a defendant
did not take, attempt, or intend to take a life.4"
The majority subsequently stated that objective state legislation
evidence is not the only factor in determining whether a punish-
ment breaches the "evolving standard of decency" standard.42 The
Court noted that the Constitution entrusts the Court with the fi-
nal judgment, and, in the end, once a consensus on what the
"evolving standard of decency" on the issue is reached, the Court
still must ask whether there is reason to reach a decision that is
contrary to societal values and state legislation.43
Justice Stevens then applied this framework, looking at state
legislation and examining arguments whether to agree or disagree
with state judgments in application to the case at hand.44 He
noted that, prior to 1986, there was no state legislation from
which to evaluate state opinion toward execution of the mentally
36. Id. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
37. Id. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), where the Court held that
imprisonment for an 'addiction' to a substance was not cruel and unusual, but was exces-
sive and in violation of the Eighth Amendment because it was imposing a punishment on
the status of a narcotic addiction.
38. Id. at 2247.
39. Id. at 312 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Chief Justice Warren explained
in that case, "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man.... The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 100-101.
40. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
41. Id. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782
(1982).
42. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 313.
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retarded.45 In 1986, Georgia enacted the first statute barring the
execution of a mentally retarded criminal based on the public re-
action to an execution of the type.46 Two years later, Congress
passed legislation reinstating the federal death penalty in 1988,
which contained a provision prohibiting the execution of the men-
tally retarded.47 In 1989, the State of Maryland followed with the
promulgation of a statute similar to both the Georgia and the fed-
eral statute.48 When the Court decided Penry v. Lynaugh, in 1989,
it held that these three statutes, along with the fact that 14 states
that did not administer the death penalty, under any circum-
stances, was insufficient to establish that the "evolving standard
of decency" did not permit the execution of mentally retarded
49murderers.
The majority in Atkins stated that changing times and nation-
wide attention since Penry was decided merited reconsideration of
the issue.0 For instance, from 1989 to the present, seventeen
states enacted statutes similar to Georgia and Maryland: Ken-
tucky, Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington,
Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska, South Dakota, Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, North Carolina, and Texas." Vir-
ginia and Nevada also have similar provisions that have passed in
at least one house of the state legislature.52 Justice Stevens noted
that it is not the specific number of states that have enacted this
type of legislation that is crucial, but whether there is great uni-
formity in the direction of the change.53 Considering the fact that
legislation giving protection to those found guilty was relatively
45. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
46. Id. at 314. The Georgia statute is Ga.Code Ann. § 17-7-131(j) (Supp. 1988).
47. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313. The federal statute was The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
21 U.S.C. § 848(1). The death penalty law was expanded shortly after with the Federal
Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3596 (c). This expansion also included a provision
preventing the execution of the mentally retarded. Id. at n. 10.
48. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
49. Id.
50. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314.
51. Id. at 315. KY.REV.STAT. ANN. §§532.130, 532..135, 532.140; TENN.CODE ANN. §39-
13-203; N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-20A-2.1; ARK.CODE ANN. § 5-4-618; COLO.REV.STAT. ANN. § 16-
9-401; WASH.REV.CODE § 10.95.030; IND.CODE §§ 35-36-9-2 - 35-36-9-6; KAN.STAT.ANN. §21-
4623; N.Y.CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27; NEB.REV.STAT. § 28-105.01; S.D.CODIFIED LAWS §
23A-27A-26.1; ARIz.REV.STAT. ANN. 13-703.02; CONN.GEN.STAT. § 53A-46A; FLA.STAT. ANN.
§ 921.137; MO.REV.STAT. § 565.030; 2001-346 N.C.SESS. LAWS P. 45. ID. at 315, n.12-15. In
Texas, the statute was passed in both the House and the Senate, but Texas Governor Perry
vetoed the bill. Id. at n.16.
52. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315. Virginia Senate Bill No. 497 (2002); House Bill No. 957
(2002); See also Nevada Assembly Bill 353 (2001). Id at n.17.
53. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
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rare, the high number of states that are now excluding those con-
victed who are mentally retarded suggested that society deems
mentally retarded offenders less culpable for their crimes than
those of average intelligence who commit crimes." Additionally,
the majority noted that not only did the legislation pass in these
states, it passed overwhelmingly." Justice Stevens added that
even the states that remained without legislation prohibiting the
execution of the mentally retarded did not carry out the practice.56
Regarding states with higher execution rates that do not prohibit
executing mentally retarded individuals, only five have carried out
an execution of a person with an IQ level of 70 or less. 7 The Court
concluded that executing mentally retarded individuals "has be-
come truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus
has developed against it.""
Justice Stevens acknowledged that a constitutional prohibition
on executing the mentally retarded still leaves many questions
unanswered.59 There will, for example, be situations in which
some defendants who claim to be mentally retarded will not fall
into the category of mentally retarded individuals that the na-
tional consensus protects."° However, Justice Stevens left the task
of developing methods to determine which defendants fall into the
protected area of mentally retarded criminals to the states, in
much the same way that the Court has left it to the states to es-
tablish definitions of insanity.61
Justice Stevens and the majority proceeded to inquire as to
whether there are reasons that should keep them from following
the national consensus." The Court asserted that not only does
the national consensus show that mentally retarded defendants
have a lower level of moral culpability, but that the evolving na-
tional consensus also finds that "some of the characteristics of
mental retardation undermine the strength of the procedural pro-
54. Id.
55. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
56. Id. New Hampshire and New Jersey, for instance, still permit administering the
death penalty to mentally retarded criminals; however, they have not carried out that
practice in decades. Id.
57. Id. The states are Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id. at
n.20.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 317.
60. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
61. Id. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
62. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
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tections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards." 3 For
instance, mentally retarded individuals, unlike insane individuals,
know the difference between right and wrong and are competent
to stand trial, but their impairments limit their ability to under-
stand and process information, to communicate, to learn from
their mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, to control their im-
pulses, and to understand the reactions of others.64 The majority
stated that there exists no evidence that mentally retarded defen-
dants commit more crimes than the non-retarded defendants, but
they do tend to act on impulse rather than by premeditation. 5 For
the preceding reasons, the majority concluded that mentally re-
tarded individuals were not immune from the criminal justice pro-
cedures and penalties, but that deficiencies do diminish their per-
sonal culpability.66
In reviewing the Court's jurisprudence regarding capital pun-
ishment, the majority in Atkins examined the reasons often cited
by the Court to justify capital punishment.67  The two primary
justifications were retribution and deterrence.68 Regarding retri-
bution, the majority held that, to determine an appropriate pun-
ishment, one must look at the level of culpability of the defendant,
noting that the Court has held that death sentences are only ap-
propriate for those defendants who have committed crimes of the
highest severity.69 For example, in Godfrey v. Georgia,7" the Court
held that a death sentence was only appropriate to a murderer
with "a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any
person guilty of murder." Justice Stevens reasoned, based on God-
frey, that if the average murderer did not meet the level of culpa-
bility necessary for the death penalty, a mentally retarded mur-
derer certainly did not meet that level and the purpose of retribu-
tion would not be met.71
Justice Stevens also concluded that the second justification for
the death penalty, deterrence, could not be met by executing the
mentally retarded either.72 In Enmund v. Florida,73 the Supreme
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 319.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 319.
70. 466 U.S. 420, 433 (1980).




Court reasoned that, "it seems likely that 'capital punishment can
serve as a deterrent only when a murder is the result of premedi-
tation and deliberation."' As previously mentioned, the majority
found that the diminished intellectual capacity of a mentally re-
tarded person causes them to act on impulse rather than by pre-
meditation.74 According to the Court, the limited behavioral and
intellectual capabilities of a mentally retarded individual makes it
highly unlikely that the possibility of being executed will enter
into the thought process when he makes a decision to act.75 Nei-
ther would eliminating those who are mentally retarded from be-
ing executed serve as a deterrent for the others who are not men-
tally retarded, since those murderers will not be protected and will
continue to be subjected to the possibility of being executed.76 For
these reasons, Justice Stevens and the majority concluded that
executing the mentally retarded would not positively affect the
overall goal of deterrence with respect to murder.77
The second reason that the Court found to justify eliminating
the mentally retarded from the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty was the reduced capacity of mentally retarded of-
fenders. 8 Justice Stevens stated that mentally retarded defen-
dants were at a high risk of wrongful executions based on the in-
creased potential of forced confessions, their diminished ability to
give constructive assistance to counsel, and the fact that they are
poor witnesses.7' He also noted that their reduced capacities pro-
hibit them from providing sufficient mitigating circumstances
when faced with evidence of aggravating factors shown by the
prosecution. ° Finally, the Court advanced the position that men-
tally retarded individuals have a demeanor that tends to make it
appear as if they have an absence of remorse for the crimes that
were committed." The preceding reasons led the Court to deter-
mine that the reduced capacity of mentally retarded criminals
leads to wrongful executions that are impermissible to the Court
and to the "evolving standard of decency." 2
73. 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982).





79. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
80. Id.




The Court's thorough examination of whether the imposition of
the death penalty on mentally retarded murderers violates the
Eighth Amendment led them to the following conclusions: (1) the
practice of executing mentally retarded individuals did not further
the purposes of retribution or deterrence; (2) state legislative
trends demonstrate a national consensus against this practice;
and (3) that the practice violated the "evolving standard of de-
cency" of today's society, rendering it an excessive and unconstitu-
tional punishment.83 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Virginia Supreme Court and remanded it for pro-
ceedings consistent with the findings made in the majority opin-
* 84ion.
The dissent, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Jus-
tices Scalia and Thomas, criticized the majority for relying on
state legislation and contemporary values that it derived from pro-
fessional and religious groups, international opinions, and public
opinion polls to determine what was the national consensus on
executing mentally retarded criminals.85 With respect to the use
of state legislation, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that its use
was critical in making a determination of what the "evolving stan-
dard of decency" is and in interpreting the Eighth Amendment.86
However, he disagreed with the conclusions of the majority." The
majority found that the legislation of 17 states was sufficient for a
finding of a national consensus, but the majority failed to look at
the 19 other states that left a determination of proper punishment
to a judge or jury, which have a more intimate understanding of
the defendant and the facts of the case.88 The Chief Justice also
pointed out one major flaw in the majority's analysis: the failure to
consider the trends of sentencing juries throughout the country. 9
He stated that precedent has shown that jury involvement in a
case reflects the relationship between the penal system and con-
temporary community values,9" concluding, "The work product of
legislatures and sentencing jury determinations ought to be the
sole indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary Ameri-
83. Id.
84. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
85. Id. at 322. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 323 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
820 Vol. 41
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can conceptions of decency for purposes of the Eighth Amend-
ment."
By expressing his opinion that those are the only two factors
necessary for making a determination on interpreting the Eighth
Amendment, the Chief Justice found the use of international opin-
ion as a secondary source by the majority to be highly erroneous.92
The majority used international opinion not as primary evidence
to make its decision, only as evidence to add weight to its deci-
sion.93 Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed that the feelings of citi-
zens and governments of other nations added anything to an
analysis to determine what was the "national" consensus.94 He
stated, "For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we
are looking, then the viewpoints of other countries simply are not
relevant."95
Chief Justice Rehnquist objected further to the majority's use of
public opinion polls and official positions taken by professional
and religious groups. 6 He expressed his opinion that none of this
evidence should be granted any weight in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment, especially when state legislatures had already ad-
dressed the issue or left the issue alone.97 Not only did he disagree
with the use and relevancy to the use of this type of evidence, the
Chief Justice stressed that the public opinion data presented to
the Court in this case was highly unreliable.98 He said that polls,
like the ones presented and used by the majority, had numerous
flaws in their methodology, such as variations in the population
chosen for the survey, the questions asked and how they are struc-
tured, and the analysis used to compile the statistics and interpret
them.99 In conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the ma-
jority went well beyond the indicators that would discern a proper
evaluation of the national consensus on whether mentally re-
tarded individuals should be exempted from the class of persons
who are subject to the administration of the death penalty. 00 For
91. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 325 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
96. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 326 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 327 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the preceding reasons, Chief Justice Rehnquist respectfully dis-
sented."'1
Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas,
also vehemently dissented. ' He argued that the decision reached
by the majority was neither supported by the actual text of the
Constitution nor by modern standards.'0 3 He exclaimed that the
majority decision was predicated solely on the personal ideals of
the members of the Court.' 4 To interpret the Eighth Amendment,
Justice Scalia deemed a punishment to be "cruel and unusual"
only if it fell into one of two categories: punishments that were
cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted and
ratified and punishments that were in violation of the "evolving
standards of decency".
5
According to Justice Scalia, when the Bill of Rights was
adopted, only "idiots," those who were severely or profoundly men-
tally retarded, were exempt from criminal sanctions or punish-
ments.' 6 Those who were mentally retarded on a lower level,
those who were not "idiots," did not receive any differential treat-
ment than those with average intelligence.' 7 Justice Scalia ac-
cordingly concluded that the execution of the "mildly" mentally
retarded was not prohibited at the time of the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, and did not fall into the first category of punishments
that will be deemed "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth
Amendment.0 8
Justice Scalia also found that execution of this small group of
persons did not fall within the second category of "cruel and un-
usual" punishments. 9 To determine whether or not a punish-
ment violated the "evolving standard of decency," Justice Scalia
stated that only objective indicia should be used, not the personal
views of the justices."' He argued that the first and clearest indi-
cator of current social values was legislation passed by elected of-
ficials, the same primary factor used by the majority."' Justice
101. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 328 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 339 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 340 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia claimed that the majority's conclusion, that a national con-
sensus was present based on state legislation, was erroneous. '
He stated that less that half of the states that permit capital pun-
ishment have legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally
retarded."3 To Justice Scalia, less than half did not equal a "na-
tional consensus" and Supreme Court precedents demand the
same."4 The "consensus" met by the majority represents more of
the inadequacies that the Court has used to show a failure of a
consensus." 5 Justice Scalia also pointed out that the statutes that
are enacted are still young, none being older than 14 years old,
116
and that it is impossible to determine whether or not the statutes
will produce sensible results to prove that this trend is reaching
the results it was intended to reach, based on the youth of those
statutes."'
Justice Scalia found the argument of infrequent execution of
mentally retarded individuals by the majority to be even less com-
pelling.1 8 Even if the practice was uncommon, which he doubted,
it was because mental retardation was being used as a mitigating
factor in the sentencing phase, proving that the current penal sys-
tem was working."9 Justice Scalia also rejected the use of public
opinion polls, official positions of professional and religious
groups, and international opinions, as irrelevant.2
Justice Scalia's dissent went on to attack the majority's argu-
ment that executing mentally retarded individuals did not further
the social policies of retribution and deterrence.'2 ' He declared
that there was no established correlation between a person's men-
tal capacity and his ability to conform his action to the law; with-
out that correlation, he argued, the policy of retribution would not
be furthered.' He remarked that as long as a mentally retarded
112. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia demonstrates that
only 18 of 38 states, or 47%, of states allowing capital punishment have enacted legislation
of this type. Id.
114. Id. at 344 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595-596;
Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789; Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408; Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300.
115. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154, 158; Stanford v.
Kentucky, U.S. 361, 372.
116. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 346 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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person understands the difference between right and wrong, he
remains as culpable as the next murderer and retribution is still
plausible.'23 With respect to deterrence, Justice Scalia found the
majority's argument (that the mentally retarded are less likely to
process information and conform their conduct relying on that in-
formation) to be erroneous.'2' He argued the deterrent effect never
reaches all those who are on the verge of committing a crime, only
some. '  Some of the mentally retarded defendants can process
information and conduct activity properly and may be reached by
a deterrent effect, rendering the majority's argument irrelevant in
Justice Scalia's eyes.
12 6
Justice Scalia stood by his conviction that this "invention" by
the Court will continue to add to the process of turning a capital
trial into a "game".127 He opined that any definition of mentally
retardation could be tweaked and twisted to fit a particular defen-
dant into a category of mental retardation which would lead to a
flood of defendants raising this particular defense.'28 The Justice
also contended that unlike an insanity defense where a person
who claims insanity has to risk being committed to a mental insti-
tution, those who raise a defense of mental retardation take no
risk at all and will not be committed to an institution.'29 There
was also the fear that current death row inmates will flood the
courts with habeas corpus petitions raising the retardation is-
sue.'3 ° Relying on the preceding analysis, Justice Scalia respect-
fully dissented.'3'
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.' ;32  The
appropriate place to begin an analysis on Supreme Court interpre-
tation of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the
Eighth Amendment is the case of Weems v. United States,'33 even
though it is not a case involving the death penalty. Weems was
123. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Id at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 354 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
133. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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convicted of falsifying records and was sentenced to 12 to 20 years
in prison with hard and painful labor.13 ' The Court held that this
punishment was excessive and violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.35  Justice
McKenna explained the first test used to determine the appropri-
ateness of a punishment under the Eighth Amendment as, "a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to the offense."'36 The Supreme Court has applied
this proportionality test numerous times to interpret the Eighth
Amendment.'37
A second standard where the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Eighth Amendment, was presented in the case of Trop v. Dul-
les,' 3 which again did not deal with a death penalty issue. The
issue in Trop was whether the penalty of a loss of an American-
born person's citizenship after a conviction by court-martial was
constitutional. 39  Trop, after escaping from a stockade where he
was being held for disciplinary reasons while serving for the U.S.
Army in French Morocco, was convicted by a general court-martial
and sentenced to three years of hard labor, forfeiture of all allow-
ances and pay, and was dishonorably discharged.4 ° In 1952, he
applied for a passport, which was denied based on the Nationality
Act of 1940, which stripped a person of his citizenship when con-
victed and dishonorably discharged from a branch of the United
134. Weems, 217 U.S. at 357-58. Weems was convicted of intentionally falsifying public
and official documents, more specifically falsifying a cashbook of the captain of the Coast
Guard in the Philippine Islands that he kept as a disbursing officer of that bureau. Id.
135. Id. at 367.
136. Id.
137. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). The Court used the proportionality
test to determine that life imprisonment without possibility of parole for possessing more
than 650 grams of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment. See also Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Supreme Court used the proportionality test to de-
termine that a punishment of 90 days for the 'status' of narcotic addiction is not cruel and
unusual punishment, but it is excessive as one day in prison would be excessive for the
crime of having an addiction.
138. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
139. Trop, 356 U.S. at 87. The facts of this case are as follows: Petitioner, Trop, was a
private in the United States Army. Trop was confined in Casablanca for a previous breach
of a disciplinary policy. On or about May 20, 1944, he escaped from his confinement. He
was discovered the following day by an Army truck walking along a street headed towards
the town of Rabat, in French Morocco. Trop got into the truck willingly and was turned
over to the military police shortly thereafter. Trop testified that at the time he was picked




States Military for a reason of wartime desertion.141 The Supreme
Court held that this statute was beyond the war powers of Con-
gress and was therefore unconstitutionally barred by the Eighth
Amendment.
2
The Eighth Amendment implications that resulted from this
case served as the backbone for determining whether a punish-
ment was in violation of the cruel and unusual clause of the
Eighth Amendment. With regard to the Eighth Amendment in
Trop, the Court declared, "The words of the Eighth Amendment
are not precise and their scope is not static; the Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of maturing society."
143
As with any analysis of a death penalty issue, an analysis of the
appropriateness of the death penalty based on an Eighth Amend-
ment interpretation using the proportionality and evolving stan-
dards of decency tests must begin with Furman v. Georgia.44 In
Furman, the issue was whether the application of the death pen-
alty, in the manner that it was being administered in 1972 was
constitutional based on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Constitution of the United States.145 All nine Justices filed
separate opinions. 46 In light of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Court held by a 5-4 margin that the death pen-
alty was being administered arbitrarily and capriciously, effec-
tively placing a moratorium on the death penalty in the United
States.'47 Justice Douglas, as well as the rest of the majority of the
Court, applied the proportionality test and the evolving standards
of decency test to aid in reaching the decision that the death pen-
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)(8) (1940). The pertinent part of the statute reads as follows: "A
person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose
his nationality by-...
(8) Deserting the military or naval forces of the United States in the time of war, pro-
vided he is convicted thereof by court martial and as the result of such conviction is
dismissed or dishonorably discharged from the service of such military or naval
forces..."
142. Trop. 356 U.S. at 104.
143. Id. at 100-101.
144. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in three cases and
heard them at the together as one case. The cases that were combined were Furman v.
State, 225 Ga. 253 (1969), Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790 (1969), and Branch v. State, 447
S.W.2d 932 (1969).
145. Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
146. Id.
147. Id. The Court found that the legislation of death penalty states was ineffective
because it did not have proper safeguards against the improper use of jury discretion to
impose the death penalty, making the legislation arbitrary and capricious. Id.
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alty was not being properly administered. '48 The Court in Furman
did not prohibit the death penalty indefinitely; it left open the op-
portunity for states to construct death penalty legislation that cor-
rected the problems that were addressed in Furman.'49 The states
that administered the death penalty did just that, and the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty was again addressed in Gregg v.
Georgia.50
In Gregg, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of armed
robbery and two counts of murder.' Gregg was sentenced to
death based on Georgia's reconstructed death penalty statute.
2
The Court, in examining the Georgia statute, broke the opinion
down into three parts: (1) an examination of the statute,' 53 (2) a
determination of whether any death penalty statute can be consti-
tutional,1 54 and, (3) a determination of whether the Georgia death
penalty statute is constitutional.'
The Court then addressed the first issue of the case, whether it
was possible that any death penalty legislation could be constitu-
tional.' The Court noted that Furman left this issue open and
held that the death penalty is constitutional. 5 ' The Court looked
to the evolving standard of decency test, using objective indicia,
and found that the death penalty, in general, did not violate that
standard.'58 Finally, the Court concluded that Georgia's death
penalty statute solved the jury discretion problems that caused
148. Id. at 242. Justice Douglas also found the administration of the death penalty was
discriminatory in that it was applied unequally to those who were poor, young, black, and
ignorant. Id. at 250.
149. 408 U.S. 238.
150. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
151. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 160. It is apparent from the majority opinion that the facts of
the case are as follows. Troy Gregg and his traveling companion Floyd Allen were hitchhik-
ing in Florida. Two men, Fred Simmons and Bob Moore, picked up Gregg and Allen and
continued north until their car broke down. Simmons bought another car and they contin-
ued their journey. The four men picked up another hitchhiker, Dennis Weaver, and headed
toward Atlanta. Weaver was left off in Atlanta, and the remainder of the crew headed
north until they made a visit to a rest stop on the highway. The following morning, Sim-
mons and Moore's bodies were found in a ditch. Gregg and Allen were picked up the next
day in Simmons' car. A pistol was found on the person of Gregg that was later determined
to be the weapon that killed Simmons and Moore. Id. at 158-59.
152. Id. The reconstructed statute can be found at GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503.
153. Id. at 162-68.
154. Id. at 168-87.
155. Id. at 187-207.
156. Id. at 168.
157. Id. at 176-87.
158. Id. at 179-80. To make their decision, the Court looked to state legislation passed
since Furman and the responses that juries have made since the enactment of the new
state legislation. Id.
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the Court in Furman to find death penalty legislation at the time
unconstitutional, and, in essence, reinstated the death penalty in
the United States for those states that had legislation similar to
Georgia's.'59
With the preceding background in place, the next step is to ex-
amine how the Court has dealt with applying the death penalty to
inmates with a certain "status," such as insanity and age, begin-
ning with Ford v. Wainwright.6 ' Alvin Ford was convicted of
murder and received a sentence of death in 1974.161 Although Ford
was competent at the time of the offense, he began to display signs
of behavioral changes while on death row, beginning with simple
confusion and graduating in seriousness as the years went by.
6
1
Eventually, the seriousness of his mental behavior led him to be-
lieve that he was Pope John Paul III.63 Ford was examined for 14
months by a psychiatrist, Dr. Jamal Amin, who determined that
Ford suffered from "a severe, uncontrollable, mental disease which
closely resembles 'Paranoid Schizophrenia With Suicide Poten-
tial", and "a major mental disorder... severe enough to substan-
tially affect Mr. Ford's present ability to assist in the defense of
his life." 64 Refusing to see Dr. Amin again because of his belief
that Amin was part of the conspiracy, Ford was examined by an-
other psychiatrist.' The second psychiatrist, Dr. Kaufman, found
that Ford did not understand why he was about to face an execu-
tion, made no association between the homicide he committed and
the death penalty, and did not believe he was going to be executed
because he owned prisons and controlled the government through
mind waves.'66 This type of examination of Ford continued with
numerous other doctors reaching the same conclusion, that Ford
was insane."'
159. Id. at 187-207.
160. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
161. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401.
162. Id. at 402. Ford acquired the delusion that a conspiracy was in place by the Ku
Klux Klan that was designed to compel him to commit suicide. He then began believing
that the prison guards were killing inmates and burying the bodies in the concrete that
formed the jail beds. He also felt that the women in his family were in the jailhouse and
were being tortured and sexually abused, as well as other members of his family being held
hostage. He claimed that 135 of his friends and family were being held hostage somewhere
in the jail. The hostages he believed to be in the jail grew in number as well as types of
people being held, including United States Senators. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 402-03.
165. Id. at 403.
166. Ford, 477 U.S. at 403.
167. Id. at 403-04.
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In 1984, the Governor of Florida signed a death warrant for
Ford.'68 Before his execution, his case made its way through the
court system to the Supreme Court of the United States.169 The
question that the Court faced was whether the Constitution per-
mits the execution of a person who is shown to be insane.7 ' The
Court stated that if a punishment was cruel and unusual at the
time of the construction of the Bill of Rights, it fit within the pro-
hibition of cruel and unusual punishments of the present soci-
ety.' 7' However, the Court looked at more than just whether the
punishment was banned in the 18th century; the Court also ad-
hered to the evolving standards of decency test.'72 "Idiots" and
"lunatics" at common law were exempt from receiving the death
penalty because they were not chargeable for their actions."3 The
majority found no evidence supporting the death penalty for those
who were insane at common law, only evidence supporting the
contrary.174 In examining the evolving standard of decency in the
modern society, the Court looked to state legislatures and found
that no state allowed the execution of the insane, for the reasons
of lack of retributive value and diminished culpability. 7 1 With
this evidence in hand, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited executing the insane, establishing the first
category of inmates protected from execution.'76
The next "status" to be considered as exempt from the death
penalty is age, specifically those under the age of 16, added to the
list in Thompson v. Oklahoma.'77 The issue in Thompson was
whether the sentence of death should be carried out on a 15-year-
old "child"'78 at the time of the offense.'79 Justice Stevens clearly
168. Id. at 404.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 405.
171. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
172. Id. at 406.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 408.
175. Id.
176. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
177. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
178. OKLA. STAT., TIT. 10, § 1112(b) (1981) defines a "child" as "any person under eight-
een (18) years of age, except for any person sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age who
is charged with murder."
179. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-819. Thompson, along with three older people, was
involved in the murder of his brother-in-law. The victim was shot, cut in his throat, chest
and abdomen, had bruises and a broken leg. The victim was then chained to a concrete
block and thrown in a river. All four players in the murder were tried separately and sen-
tenced to death. Id. at 819.
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explained that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment gave no
guidelines as to how to interpret the Amendment and left that up
to future judges to determine based on the evolving standard of
decency test."'° The Court looked at state legislation and jury de-
terminations, and then examined this evidence to come up with
what the standard of decency of a contemporary society. 181 The
evidence proved that there was no Oklahoma legislation showing
that a person under the age of 16 was anything other than a
"child" and treated as such in the judicial system, on the basis
that a "child" has not matured to the level of culpability required
to have the death penalty imposed upon him. 82 As for the other
states, 19 states that had death penalty legislation provided no
minimum age for the death penalty, while 18 others had age lim-
its of at least 16 years old. 8' The American Bar Association and
the American Law Institute, as well as most of the countries in
the world have demonstrated their opposition to execution of ju-
veniles." The Court also examined the actions of juries when
faced with the decision of executing juveniles, and discovered that
it was rare and had not happened since 1948.18 The Court then
went on to find that executing those under 16 did not further the
goals of punishment of retribution and deterrence, nor was it ap-
propriate considering those under the age of 16 did not rise to the
level of culpability for their actions in the same way as adults.
86
Justice Stevens and the majority concluded, based on the preced-
ing evidence, that the cruel and unusual clause of the Eighth
Amendment and the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited executing those under the age of 16.187
The final "status" to be examined in this note, and most crucial
to the decision made in Atkins v. Virginia,"' is mental retardation,
which was discussed only once prior to Atkins in Penry v. Ly-
180. Id. at 822.
181. Id. at 823.
182. Id. at 824.
183. Id. at 826-829.
184. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
185. Id. at 832. The Court states that of the thousands of homicide cases between 1982
and 1986, only 5 of the 1,393 sentenced to death were juveniles. Id.
186. Id. at 833-839.
187. Id. at 838. The Supreme Court, in the same term, decided the case of Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and held that the age limitations imposed on the death
penalty are for those under the age of 16. Those who are 16 and older are members of the
class of persons who are eligible to receive the death penalty.
188. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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naugh.'89 For the foregoing reasons, it is necessary to discuss
Penry in great detail.
Pamela Carpenter was in her home in Livingston, Texas, when
she was raped, beaten, and stabbed with a pair of scissors. 9 '
While receiving emergency treatment, Carpenter died.'"' Prior to
her death, however, Carpenter was able to give the police a de-
scription of the person who beat and raped her, which led to local
officials naming Penry as the chief suspect.' 9' Penry, at the time of
being named a suspect, was released on parole after being con-
victed for a prior rape.'93 Originally Penry denied any involvement
in the rape, but subsequently confessed to the rape and was
charged with capital murder. 4
Prior to Penry's trial, a competency hearing was held where Dr.
Jerome Brown made clear in his testimony that Penry was men-
tally retarded.'95 Dr. Brown's testing showed that Penry had an
IQ level of 54.96 Furthermore, Dr. Brown testified that at the time
of the rape, Penry was 22 years old, but had the mental capacity of
a 6 -year-old child.'97
After a finding of Penry's competency to stand trial, the court
found that Penry's confessions were voluntary and relevant evi-
dence in the case. 98 Also at trial, Penry presented an insanity de-
fense backboned by the testimony of Dr. Jose Garcia. 9  Penry's
mother was also put on the stand, where she testified that Penry
could not learn in school, failing to complete the first grade.00 In
corroboration with Dr. Garcia's and Penry's mother's testimony,
Penry's sister testified that their mother had repeatedly beat
Penry over the head as well as locked him in a closet for long peri-
189. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).





195. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
196. Id. at 308. Also discovered in the case was the fact that Penry, as a child, suffered
from organic brain damage, which was linked to trauma to his brain that was caused dur-
ing birth. It was also shown that Penry had his IQ tested over the years, revealing scores
between 50 and 63, showing mild to moderate retardation. Id. at 307.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. Dr. Garcia testified that Penry was moderately retarded triggered by his or-
ganic brain damage, which was caused more likely than not from birth. It was Dr. Garcia's
belief that Penry could not have appreciated the wrongfulness of his act due to his suffering
from an organic brain disorder. Id. at 308-309.
200. Penry, 492 U.S. at 309.
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ods of time without access to the bathroom. 21 Further testimony
showed that Penry was in and out of numerous hospitals and
schools until his father pulled him out at age 12.202 The state re-
butted this evidence with the testimony of two psychiatrists who
testified that, at the time of the offense, Penry knew the difference
between right and wrong; that he did not suffer from a mental ill-
ness, just a limited mental ability; that he was only suffering from
an anti-social disorder and not insanity; and that he suffered from
a mental limitation that failed to allow him to learn from mis-
takes 2
The jury rejected Penry's insanity defense and Penry was con-
victed of capital murder, with the penalty phase to come the fol-
lowing day.0 4 In order to determine the appropriate sentence, the
jury had to answer three "special issues:"
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with
the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased of an-
other would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a con-
tinuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the de-
fendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response
to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.20 '
In order for the trial court to sentence Penry to death, all three
of these questions had to be answered unanimously in the affirma-
tive.206 Despite numerous objections raised by the defense, which
were all overruled, the jury did answer unanimously "yes" to all
three questions, and the trial court subsequently sentenced Penry
to death.2 7
201. Id.
202. Id. It was also shown that Penry's aunt spent over a year attempting to teach him
how to print his own name. Id.
203. Id. The psychiatrists who testified for the state were Dr. Kenneth Vogtsberger and
Dr. Felix Peebles.
204. Id. at 310.
205. Penry, 492 U.S. at 310. (Citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN., ARTS. 37.071 (b)).
206. Id. (Citing TEX. CODE. CRIM PROC. ANN., ART. 37.071 (c)-(e)). If, however, the jury
does not answer all three questions in the affirmative or the answers are not reached
unanimously, the court must sentence the person to life imprisonment. Id.
207. Id. at 310-311.
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Penry appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of the United
States. °8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Penry argued
that the execution of the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual
punishment, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. s°9 Penry argued that there was a growing
national consensus excluding the mentally retarded from being a
member of the class of persons who were eligible to receive a death
sentence.21 The State countered this argument by denying the
existence of a national consensus and argued that a jury was best
suited to determine those who should receive the death penalty
and those who should not by weighing the mitigating and aggra-
vating circumstances presented to them.211
Justice O'Conner relied on objective evidence, specifically state
legislation, to determine what the contemporary national stan-
212dards were. Georgia was the only state with legislation barring
the execution of mentally retarded murderers, although Maryland
had a similar statute that had not become effective at the time of
Penry.2"3 The Court referred back to Ford v. Wainwright"4 and
Thompson v. Oklahoma.1 5 Justice O'Conner and the majority
found that a clear national consensus was established in those
cases by the fact that at least a majority of the states had legisla-
tion barring the execution of those with a status of either insanity
or minority."'  Those states barring executions in general, and
those that administered the death penalty, but have statutory
limitations on executing mentally retarded, did not rise to the
level of a majority or to the level of a national consensus.2"7
Another objective factor noted by the majority was jury behav-
ior, however, Penry presented no evidence of the kind.2 8 Penry
did offer evidence of public opinion polls, which the Court rejected
based on the notion that type of information may be faulty and
would be reflected in state legislation.2 9 The Court therefore con-
cluded that a national consensus did not exist that would provide
208. Id. at 313.
209. Id. at 328. See Supra note 33.
210. Id. at 329.
211. Id.
212. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331.
213. Id. See GA. CODE ANN. § 117-7-131(j) and MD. CODE ANN., ART. 27 § 412 (f)(1)(1989).
214. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).




219. Id. at 335.
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sufficient objective evidence for the Court to find that executing
the mentally retarded violates the evolving standards of decency
test.
220
Justice O'Conner also addressed Penry's argument that execut-
ing the mentally retarded did not further the social purposes of
deterrence and retribution.' Penry argued that the mentally re-
tarded have diminished mental capabilities prohibiting them from
understanding and processing the nature and consequences of
their actions, making the purposes of deterrence and retribution
unreachable and irrelevant for these types of persons.222 Justice
O'Conner concluded that the capabilities of mentally retarded per-
sons varied significantly from person to person, that some will
reach the level of culpability required to receive the death penalty,
and that such determination is for a jury to make.23 The Court in
Penry held that a national consensus did not exist at the time of
the case and without one, there was no evidence to find that exe-
cuting mentally retarded murderers is not cruel and unusual and
was therefore not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.22 4  The
Penry decision was overturned by the focus of this note, Atkins v.
Virginia.225
Interpreting the Eighth Amendment throughout the history of
the Supreme Court has consistently been a daunting task. The
main reason for the Court's difficulty has been the troublesome
task of discerning whether a national consensus exists and
whether it violates the evolving standard of decency test. The
Court in Atkins v. Virginia overcame this problem and reached the
proper conclusion. 26 The majority looked to what past decisions
had dictated as the most objective and reliable evidence for dis-
cerning the evolving standard of decency: state legislation.27 It is
clear from the action that the states have taken that a national
consensus exists against executing mentally retarded people.
State legislation is the most reliable evidence to use to interpret
220. Penry, 492 U.S. at 335.
221. Id. at 336.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 338-39.
224. Id. at 340. The Court affirmed the decision in part and reversed in part. The case
was remanded for a new trial based on the findings on the first issue in the case. On re-
mand, Penry was again found guilty and again was sentenced to death. That case was also
appealed to the United States Supreme Court in 2001 and again his death sentence was
overturned. Penry v. Johnson, 121 S.Ct. 1910 (2001).
225. 534 U.S. 304.
226. Atkins, 534 U.S. at 304.
227. Id. at 312
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the Eighth Amendment because of its accuracy in depicting what
the American people desire and feel appropriate. The Court in
Atkins, applying this objective evidence, clearly arrived at the
right decision. 28 Had the Court ignored this evidence and reached
a decision that was contrary to this evidence, the evolving stan-
dard of decency test would in essence have been eliminated. The
example set would ignore the best evidence available and leave
future courts, in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, with the
option of ignoring crucial evidence, essentially leading to inconsis-
tency and disarray in death penalty jurisprudence.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, in their dissents,
disagreed with the majority opinion.229 Both dissents attacked the
manner in which the majority reached its decision, stating that
less than half of states allowing the death penalty did not equal a
national consensus and that only objective indicia should be used
to interpret the Eighth Amendment, not personal feelings, opinion
polls, or opinions of professional and religious organizations.23
The arguments of the dissenting justices are flawed. It may be
true that less than half of the states that allow the death penalty
have statutory prohibitions against executing mentally retarded
people, and that less than half is not a majority. However, when
combined with the states that prohibit the death penalty com-
pletely, a clear majority exists. A state that does not allow the
death penalty for any purpose certainly does not permit it when
used against a person who is mentally retarded. Therefore, those
states must be added to the total number of states prohibiting this
class of executions, showing a clear majority.
Justice Rehnquist argues that public opinion polls and opinions
of professional and religious organizations should not be used to
determine whether a national consensus exists, only objective in-
dicia should be used.23' The majority in Atkins did not use this
type of evidence as a primary factor, only as a secondary factor to
support its finding. This type of evidence was only used to
strengthen the finding, not as a primary basis for the decision,
which is not prohibited or unheard of in Supreme Court decision-
making. Personal feelings, however, should not play a part in the
decision-making process of the Supreme Court. It would be irra-
228. Id. at 315-18.
229. Id. at 321-42.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 326-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tional to believe that this practice does not take place in many de-
cisions made by the Court. It is well known that politics and per-
sonal feelings play a role not only in the appointment process of
the Supreme Court, but also in the closed-door debates of the
Court. Justice Scalia did not, however, provide any evidence that
this practice played a key role in making the decision in Atkins, or
that this practice severely affected the outcome of the case. With-
out any evidence of this, Justice Scalia's assertion is mere opinion
and speculation.
This decision sketched out another exception in death penalty
jurisprudence, and rightfully so. Not only is the practice of execut-
ing mentally retarded people unconstitutional, but unethical, im-
moral, and disgraceful. The Supreme Court has held that execut-
ing a person under the age of 16 was unconstitutional because
children of that age could reach the level of mental culpability re-
quired to warrant a sentence of death.232 To allow the execution of
a person who has the same mental capacity as those who the
Court have determined do not have the appropriate mental capac-
ity to receive the death penalty is inconsistent and illogical, juris-
prudential traits that the American system seeks to avoid.
As noted, the Court has carved out numerous exemptions to the
category of people that are eligible to receive the death penalty,
including insane persons, those under the age of 16, and now the
mentally retarded. The Court has not concluded its examination
of the death penalty, yet. Recently, the Supreme Court halted an
execution that was to take place in Texas due to the fact that the
defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, claiming he
heard voices instructing him to kill himself.233 The Justices of the
Court will meet privately to discuss whether a person who is men-
tally ill has the mental capacity necessary to have the death pen-
alty imposed on him. If the Court does not feel that those who are
mentally ill (which fits into the categories of the mentally retarded
and insane) are mentally culpable to receive a death sentence, a
new exception will be added to the list.
The issue of whether juveniles over the age of 16 are deserving
of the death penalty has also been presented to the Court for re-
examination. In the case of In re Kevin Nigel Stanford, the major-
ity decided not to revisit the issue, but four dissenting justice
232. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
233. See Colburn v. Texas, 966 S.W.2d 511 (1998).
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thought the issue should be reconsidered due to its similarities to
the methodology applied in Atkins.3
Death penalty jurisprudence in the United States has been un-
der great scrutiny in the past fifteen years. Numerous changes
and exclusions have been made about how, why, and to whom we
apply the death penalty. The future is quite unpredictable. None
of the cases presented in this note suggest that the Court will soon
examine the constitutionality of the use of the death penalty in
general. Some cases make it abundantly clear that the decision
made applies strictly to the factual situations at hand. However,
the death penalty may not have a bright future in this country.
Almost all civilized nations have abolished the death penalty,
some placing great pressure on the United States to do the same.
Public opinion for the sanction has dropped over the last ten
years. Illinois and Maryland have both placed moratoriums on
the death penalty over the last few years to examine its appropri-
ateness. Finally, the Court in applying the evolving standard of
decency test has been chopping away at capital punishment. If
these trends continue, the Supreme Court may be faced with ap-
plying this evidence, and a death penalty state we may no longer
be.
Matthew Debbis
234. In re Kevin Stanford, 123 S.Ct. 472 (2002).
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